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In this paper, we develop a forward-looking small scale macroeconomic model (SSMM) of the 
Indonesian economy which is potentially useful for carrying out monetary policy analysis. The 
Batini-Haldane (1999) model is used as the theoretical underpinning for the development of the 
model along with the well-known Taylor policy rule (1993). The tracking performance of the 
model is found to be satisfactory. We conduct deterministic and stochastic simulations to examine 
the role of the central bank’s credibility in achieving the inflation target and to suggest 
appropriate monetary policy responses. Policy simulations indicate that it is crucial for the 
Indonesian authority to address its credibility for Indonesia to achieve a lower inflation rate. 
Simulations to trace out the inflation-output tradeoff frontier also show that a monetary policy 
rule that targeted both the inflation and output gap will result in less macroeconomic volatility. 
We also found that the inclusion of the exchange rate into the monetary policy rule as an 
additional feedback variable warrants serious consideration in the future course of monetary 
policy management.  
 
1. Introduction 
Indonesia, a country with a vast archipelago, has always been the subject of fascination by people 
in the world for her richness in cultural diversity, abundance of her natural resources, and the 
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remarkable economic success achieved over the last few decades—setting aside the incidence of 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. A country that has always amazed observers is now facing 
uncertainties regarding her future economic direction which makes her an intriguing case study 
for economic discussion, policy studies, and debates at international forums. After the inception 
of the so-called “new order” regime, Indonesia began to experience a period of sustained 
economic growth and expansion in broad-based sectors of the economy for about three decades. 
Not long after, however, this impressive economic growth was followed by sudden economic 
turmoil that was sparked off by the Asian financial crisis. This episode has created major 
structural changes for the Indonesian economy, leading the country to undergo several major 
policy changes in the areas of the exchange rate system, debt restructuring, tighter bank 
regulation, and inflation targeting policies, inter alia.  
 
  Most notably, the conduct of monetary policy has changed. The exchange rate regime has 
altered from the long-standing of fixed and managed floating system into an essentially market-
determined exchange rate system. Monetary policy is aimed specifically at stabilizing medium-
term inflation to promote sustained economic growth to provide added momentum towards 
economic recovery (BI 2003, 2004). At the same time, monetary policy tries to maintain the 
stability of the Rupiah vis-à-vis other foreign currencies to boost trade activities and to minimize 
fluctuations by prudent intervention that is necessary to absorb excess liquidity resulting from 
fiscal expansion. Further cuts in interest rates are also on its way at a gradual pace that are 
consistent with the achievement of inflation targets (BI 2003, 2004). To sum that all, one major 
change in the conduct of monetary policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis was the 
enactment of the new central banking law in May 1999. This law gives full autonomy to the 
central bank in designing, formulating, and implementing monetary policy—including the choice 
of monetary policy instrument and macroeconomic targets—in relation to achieving the goal of 
lowering the country’s inflation rate.   3
In line with this change in monetary policy conduct, this paper attempts to shed light on 
the role of central bank credibility in achieving the inflation target based on a small scale 
macroeconomic model (SSMM) of the Indonesian economy. The issue of central bank credibility 
is critical in the formation of inflationary expectations. In other words, how people perceive and 
whether they believe the central bank will be able to meet its inflation target or otherwise has a 
significant impact on economic outcomes. Indonesia has a long history combating high inflation 
rates and this paper contributes to further understanding about the importance of central bank 
credibility and its role in achieving a lower inflation rate. The small scale model that we built can 
also be useful for policy analysis in general. Thus, we also study appropriate monetary policy 
responses for Indonesia in the face of shocks based on a modified Taylor policy rule. The 
objective is to enable the central bank to take suitable policy actions to minimize inflation and 
output variability so as to ensure the stability of the economy in achieving sustained economic 
growth. As Taylor (2000a) has asserted, a very high priority is to build and estimate models in 
emerging countries, and to evaluate policy rules in these models.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the structure of the 
Indonesian SSMM and describes each equation in the model in detail. Section 3 presents the data 
and estimation results. Section 4 presents two sets of simulation experiments. The first set details 
the results of deterministic simulations to evaluate central bank credibility. The second set uses 
stochastic simulation to investigate the performance of monetary policy rules. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  A Small Scale Macroeconomic Model for Indonesia 
To understand the ways for achieving a lower inflation rate and sustained economic growth in 
Indonesia, we need a model of how the economy works. Based on this model and our 
understanding of the economy, we will try to pin down important factors that should be   4
considered by monetary policymakers in formulating their economic policies. In constructing a 
macroeconomic model, researchers usually have the option of building large-, medium-, or small-
scale models. Due to the relatively less attention given to the small scale macroeconomic model 
and its merits, we are motivated to build an SSMM for the Indonesian economy by adapting the 
Batini and Haldane (1999) model, so as to complement other existing larger-scale 
macroeconomic models for Indonesia and, hopefully, to offer an improvement to the small 
quarterly model developed by the Central Bank of Indonesia.
1 The next two subsections will 
explain the merits of an SSMM and describe our Indonesian SSMM. 
 
2.1    Why A Small Scale Macroeconomic Model? 
Macroeconomic models are usually developed in a large framework that comprises hundreds of 
equations. Some pitfalls, however, are inevitable, such as theoretical shortcomings and a partial 
failure of forecasts (Wallis 1989). In the early 1990s, the SSMM emerged as an alternative tool 
for comparing the results obtained from larger macroeconomic models. The SSMM has been 
adopted by countries such as New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, 
Australia, Spain, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela (see Haldane 1995, Leiderman and Svensson 1995, 
de Freitas and Muinhos 1999, Arreaza et al. 2003). Among the countries we have mentioned, it 
may not be coincidental that most of them are inflation-targeting countries. At this point in time, 
the SSMM has not been applied extensively and formally to Asian countries in general and 
Indonesia in particular. Hence, we hope to pioneer the study of SSMMs in the Asian context, with 
Indonesia being our choice of country in this regard. 
 
The SSMM has some important merits: first, there is a complete treatment of both the 
supply and demand sides of the economy in a succinct manner. An SSMM is deliberately kept 
small with a substantial level of aggregation, thus forcing the model to focus on key issues rather 
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than to look at excessive details in the economy. Furthermore, an SSMM is characterized by a 
compact system of equations that describe the behaviour of key macroeconomic aggregates such 
as output, inflation, money demand, exchange rates (for an open economy), interest rates, etc. 
Although the SSMM is not meant primarily for forecasting, it helps to clarify and understand the 
developments of key macroeconomic variables, for example those relevant in the process of 
determining the inflation rate in the economy. Another advantage of an SSMM is that, being 
highly aggregated, it can help to mitigate the problem of poor fit in large macroeconomic models.  
 
In our case, the forward-looking nature of the BH model—the one that we are going to 
adapt—is rather appealing since it takes into account agents’ expectations for the future. The BH 
model also takes explicit account of the impact of the exchange rate on the dynamics of inflation 
and output which is a crucial channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. Finally, the main 
benefit of using this model is that it is thought to be disaggregated enough to capture the main 
characteristics of the monetary transmission mechanism, but is still simple enough to be 
analytically tractable. Thus, an SSMM can be very useful in providing a vehicle for analyzing the 
effects of monetary policy which is credible enough to be of interest to policy-makers and 
academics alike. 
 
2.2    Indonesian SSMM 
As mentioned above, the Indonesian SSMM in this paper is adapted from the Batini and Haldane 
(1999) model. In the presentation of our SSMM for Indonesia below, lower case variables are in 
logarithms (except for interest rates) while upper case variables refer to levels. The present model 
is a small, compact, and highly aggregated macroeconometric model. There are 4 behavioural 
equations, 2 identities, and a policy rule. A description of the model is given below. 
 
   6
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In Equation (1), 
no y  denotes non-oil GDP while 
* no y  denotes non-oil potential output. The 
variable 
f qepp =−+  represents the real exchange rate with e, the nominal exchange rate, being 
the domestic currency price of foreign currency (Rupiah/foreign currency).  p  and 
f p  are the 
domestic and foreign price levels respectively, 
f y  is real foreign output, representing external 
demand, and  g  represents government spending. Δ  denotes change with respect to previous 
period. Equation (1) explains the non-oil component of aggregate demand for the Indonesian 
economy. It is a typical IS curve with the usual sign expectations such as the negative relation 
between the ex-ante real interest rate ( 1 tt t iE π + − ) and the non-oil output gap
* ()
no no yy −  as well 
as the positive relation between the real exchange rate (q ) and the non-oil output gap.    7
A distinguishing feature of Equation (1) is the existence of a term allowing the output gap 
to depend on its own lag to capture the effect of adjustment costs and the presence of forward-
looking (or the lead) term. The lead term for the non-oil output gap is motivated by the work of 
McCallum and Nelson (1999) on the optimizing IS-LM specification for monetary policy and 
business cycle analysis. This is an important modification that needs to be considered for 
Indonesia’s case since we have to acknowledge the forward-looking behaviour of economic 
agents in decision-making processes, thus enabling monetary policy to work more effectively by 
recognizing these responses. Moreover, the recent tendency for the BI to move to an inflation 
targeting regime requires a certain degree of forward-lookingness about future economic 
conditions.  
 
In Equation (2), 
o y , 
* o y , and oil  denote oil output, potential oil output, and the oil price 
respectively. Since oil revenues are critical to the Indonesian economy, we feel that a separate 
treatment of the non-oil and oil sectors is necessary and that by specifying the oil output as in 
Equation (2), we can better explain how the oil price affects the oil output gap and hence the 
dynamics in overall output movements. This equation highlights the vulnerability of Indonesia’s 
real GDP to fluctuations in the world oil price and the income from the oil sector. Equation (3) is 
an identity that states that the sum of the real non-oil output and the real oil output is equal to real 
GDP.  
 
Equation (4) is an LM curve with the conventional explanatory variables that depict real 
money balances as being dependent on a nominal interest rate (i ), reflecting the opportunity cost 
of holding money, and real output. The innovation  t 3 ε  is called “velocity” shocks on the demand 
for money. Equation (5) is the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition for an open economy, 
with the exchange risk premium being captured by the error term. 
f i  is the foreign short-term   8
interest rate. Given the financial openness of the Indonesian economy, it is plausible to assume 
that UIP holds at least approximately. However, the UIP relationship, being a stochastic identity, 
is not estimated but is included in full model simulations.  
 
Equation (6) is the inflation equation in the Indonesian SSMM based on an open 
economy Phillips curve where π  denotes the current rate of inflation and  5t ε is the innovation in 
the inflation process. Like the IS equation, the inflation equation acknowledges the lag and lead 
terms in determining the current level of inflation rate, as given by  11 (1 ) tt t E θ πθ π +− +− . In other 
words, the inflation rate is partially determined by a weighted average of past inflation and 
expected future inflation. The presence of the lagged term produces a short-run trade-off between 
output and inflation as well as inflation persistence. Inflation expectations are given by 
11 (1 ) tt t t Eπ λπ λ π
∗
++ =+ −, where 
* π  represents the inflation target and  1 0 ≤ ≤ λ  represents a 
measure of credibility of the central bank. As λ approaches 1, monetary policy becomes less 
credible and hence, λ can be interpreted as the credibility parameter for the central bank. Thus, 
the inflation expectations term explicitly allows for a targeted rate of inflation provided that λ is 
not equal to 1. Our specification of Equation (6) differs from those typically considered in the 
literature due to the addition of an exchange rate effect on domestic inflation. The presence of the 
nominal exchange rate reflects the pass-through effect of foreign prices (
f p ) on the Indonesian 
economy while the money supply lagged output gap found in this equation reflects the possible 
domestic sources of inflation.  
 
Equation (7) is a modified Taylor rule to determine the interest rate path for the authority 
which includes the exchange rate variable. In addition to the inflation and output gaps, this rule 
reacts to the change in the nominal exchange rate e . It forces the central bank to respond 
automatically to currency shocks in order to stabilize both the nominal and real exchange rates.   9
This may be very relevant for Indonesia as an emerging market economy with substantial deal of 
international trade but less than fully developed financial markets.  
 
The exchange rate plays an important role in aggregate demand through its effect on net 
exports and also on inflation through the pass-through effect. Clearly, exchange rate and interest 
rates are linked through the UIP condition. In the above policy rule, a depreciation of the 
exchange rate is expected to cause the monetary authority to raise interest rates in the next period. 
The recent increase in interest rates by BI in the face of a depreciating currency can be viewed as 
an example of such a reaction (Taylor 2000)
2. 
 
3.  Data and Estimation Results 
In this section, we describe data issues and discuss our empirical results. The datasets used in this 
paper cover quarterly series from 1983 to 2003.
3 All the data that is used in this paper are 
seasonally adjusted, wherever seasonality is found to be present. We apply the most commonly 
used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests on the logarithmic forms of the relevant 
variables.
4 The results reveal that only the domestic short-term interest rate (i ) and oil output 
(
o y ) are found to be stationary with the rest of the variables found to be an I(1) series.
5  
 
The domestic output variable is represented by the quarterly real GDP of Indonesia from 
1983:Q1 to 2003:Q4 that is decomposed into non-oil output and oil output. We employ 1993 as 
                                                 
2 Taylor (2000) explicitly pointed out the need for the Indonesian Central Bank, BI, to consider the role of 
the exchange rate in its policy rule during a conference held by BI in July 2000. For more elaborate, but 
complex, microfoundations regarding the role of the exchange rate in policy rules, see Ball (1999). He 
found that such a rule has only a minor improvement over the conventional interest rate rule. Readers are 
also referred to Svensson (2000) on small open economy models that examined the role of the exchange 
rate in policy rules explicitly.  
3 We document the sources of the data in the appendix. 
4 Only i and 
f i are not tested in log form. 
5 The unit-root test results are available upon request.   10
the base year for our study. Non-oil output is represented by the real GDP of Indonesia, excluding 
the oil output component, whereas oil output is represented by the real oil output data. The 
domestic price is represented by Indonesian Consumer Price Index (CPI), short-term interest rate 
by the 1-month SBI (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia) rate, the foreign interest rate by the US 3-month 
T-Bill rate, and inflation rate is calculated as the change in the CPI. The variable g is represented 
by the interpolated annual Indonesian government spending using the cubic spline method since 
the quarterly Indonesian government spending data is not available. The oil price variable is 
represented by the average oil price data from the International Financial Statistics. For oil 
output, we have to resort to interpolated data from 1983 to 1992. We employ the Chow-Lin 
(1971) method for best linear unbiased distribution and interpolation of time series by related 




The money supply data used in this paper is the M1 measure. In constructing the foreign 
income index, we use a geometric average of the GDPs of Indonesia’s major trading partners, 
weighted by nominal exports. These include 10 countries and 1 region: Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Japan, the U.S. and the rest of the 
OECD (ROECD). ROECD includes all members of the OECD except Japan, South Korea and the 
United States. Statistics for the ROECD are calculated as the weighted-average effect of all 
countries in the group, so that the ROECD can be interpreted as one large “country”.
7 The 
construction of the nominal effective exchange rate follows the same principle as that of the 
foreign income index. Finally, we use the World CPI Index from the International Financial 
Statistics as the proxy for the foreign price level, with the base year rebased to 1993. 
                                                 
6 The annual data for oil output from Indonesia’s statistical yearbook has two base years, namely 1983 and 
1993. We rebased the real oil output from the 1983 base year to the 1993 base year using growth rates. 
Subsequently, we obtained the quarterly oil price series as described in the text. 
7 We thank the Econometric Studies Unit (ESU) of the Department of Economics at the National 
University of Singapore for making the data available.   11
Potential non-oil and oil output are measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which is a 
commonly used method to estimate potential output. We specify the inflation target to be time-
varying over three different sub-periods: 1983:Q1–1996:Q4, 1997:Q1–1998:Q4, 1999:Q1–
2003:Q4, in which the inflation target is the average inflation rate in each of these sub-periods. 
The quarterly inflation targets are 2% for 1983:Q1–1996:Q4, 8.33% for 1997:Q1–1998:Q4, and 
1.85% for 1999:Q1–2003:Q4. Finally, Table 1 presents our estimation results.  
 
A constant term was included in all the estimated equations. In the estimation, we deal 
with uncertainty through the perfect foresight assumption i.e. rational agents make unbiased 
forecasts. Consequently, actual historical outcomes are used as a proxy for expectations, thereby 
combining expectational errors with structural residuals. The perfect foresight assumption was 
imposed in equations that contain the expected future values of macroeconomic variables viz. the 
IS and inflation equations, and the monetary policy rule. 
 
Concerning the estimation method, Valadkhani (2004) has pointed out that data 
availability in developing countries is a restrictive factor in doing sound macroeconomic 
modelling. This is very true in the case of Indonesia where the quality of data might be 
somewhere in between the undependable and the reliable due to time lags in gathering island-
wide economic data and frequent revisions. Given this, the model-builder should use a robust and 
simple method, such as OLS, which is not too sensitive to the quality of data. Klein (1989) also 
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Table 1: Estimation Results of Indonesian SSMM 
(1) IS Equation 
** *
11 ( ) 0.01 0.32( ) 0.60 ( ) 0.09 0.84
(0.004)***(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.02)*** (0.37)***
-squared=0.80; DW=2.70;  -stat=75.7; Prob( -stat)=0.00; ARCH(Prob)=0.70; Prob(JB)
no no no no no no f
t t ttt t yy yy E yy q y
RF F
−+ −= − + − + − + Δ + Δ
=0.80 
Prob( (4)) 0.48  Q =
 
(2) Oil Equation 
* ( - ) 0.005 1.32 0.03 0.17 _ _86
(0.007) (0.61)** (0.02)* (0.02)**
0.13 _ _ 0.09 _ _ _
(0.02)** (0.02)***
-Squared=0.73; DW=1.24;  -stat=42.16; Prob( -stat)=0.00; AR
oo f f
tt t y y y oil DUM YEAR y
DUM GULF WAR DUM POST GULF WAR
RF F
=− + Δ + Δ − Δ
+−
CH(Prob)=0.92; Prob(JB)=0.23 
Prob( (4)) 0.29  Q =
  
(3) LM Equation 
1 8.66 1.38 0.28 0.06 _ _89 0.21 _
(0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.10)*** (0.52)***
-squared=0.98; DW=0.47;  -stat=996.36; Prob( -stat)=0.00; ARCH(Prob)=0.19; Prob(JB)=0.60
Prob( (4
tt m p y i DUM YEAR DUM CRISIS tt
RF F
Q
− − = − +−+ +
)) 0.00 =
 
(4) Inflation Equation 
11 0.23 0.77 0.11 0.12 0.01
     (0.07)*** (NA) (0.06)**  (0.002)*** (0.02)***
-squared=0.73; DW=2.67;  -stat=49.52; Prob( -stat)=0.00; ARCH(Prob)=0.003; Prob(JB)=0.003
Prob( (4)) 0.026 
tt t t Ee m tt
RF F
Q
ππ π +− =+ + + Δ + Δ −
=
         
(5) Monetary Policy Rule Equation 
0.14 0.25( )  1.28( ) 0.29 31 2
(0.19) (0.27)*** (0.06)*** (0.01)***
-squared=0.52; DW=1.01;  -stat=27.42; Prob( -stat)=0.00; ARCH(Prob)=0.85; Prob(JB)=0.00
Prob( (4)) 0.005
iy y e tt t t
RF F
Q
ππ ∗∗ =+ − + − + Δ −− −
=




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. DW: Durbin-Watson; Q: the Ljung-Box Q autocorrelation test; JB: 
Jarque-Bera Normality test statistic. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance.   13
when the quality of the data is mediocre and it is subject to frequent revisions. Hence, in 
estimating our Indonesian SSMM, we employ the OLS method.
8 
 
The IS equation we estimated in Table 1 shows that the economy tends to be forward-
looking, as evidenced by a larger coefficient on the future output gap as compared to the previous 
period’s output gap. The future output gap parameter is found to be around 0.6 while the lagged 
output gap parameter is estimated to be only 0.32. We found that the change in the real exchange 
rate has a contemporaneous effect on the economy and it is estimated that for a 10% depreciation 
of the rupiah, the non-oil output gap will increase by about 1%. The effect of the 
contemporaneous foreign income change on the domestic non-oil output gap is found to be 
positive with an estimated coefficient of 0.84. Interestingly, the impact of the Asian financial 
crisis on Indonesia in 1997/98 was adequately captured by the explanatory variables, thus there 




Moving to the oil equation, the foreign income elasticity is found to be 1.32. The change 
in foreign income is found to have a one-quarter lagged effect on the oil output gap. We employ 
three dummy variables in the oil equation: DUM_YEAR_86 is a temporary break in 1986, 
signifying a noticeable sharp drop in the oil price and thus oil revenue; DUM_GULF_WAR is 
                                                 
8 We also estimated the system using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method and found 
the results to be quite similar with the OLS method, except that some variables are found to be 
insignificant. Given the reasons mentioned, we prefer to stick to the OLS method in obtaining the 
parameter estimates.  
9 The estimated coefficient on the real interest rate shows a negative sign as postulated by theory i.e. as the 
real cost of borrowing increase, investment is expected to fall and at the same time people will tend to save 
more and delay their spending, causing real output to fall and the output gap to narrow. However, the effect 
of the real interest rate is of a trivial magnitude and found to be statistically insignificant. Thus, we 
conclude that the domestic interest rate does not significantly affect output movements but instead affects 
the economy indirectly through the exchange rate. We therefore decided to drop the real interest rate 
variable in our final IS equation. The government gap is found to have a positive elasticity in the OLS 
results but it is again statistically insignificant. This could be due to a data problem, since we had to 
interpolate the government spending data using the cubic spline method. Thus, we also dropped the 
government spending variable in our final estimated model.   14
another temporary break in 1991, when the oil price started to spike up again due to the Gulf war 
in the late 1990s; and finally DUM_POST_GULF_WAR is to capture the effect of oil price 
stabilization and adjustment after the war. 
 
The LM equation is estimated in log levels because the variables in it are found to be 
cointegrated. In the LM equation, the income elasticity of the real demand for money is estimated 
to be about 1.4 and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. This estimate of above unity 
seems plausible for a developing economy such as Indonesia in view of the high volume of day-
to-day transactions that use hard cash. The nominal interest rate is found to have a one-period 
lagged effect on the demand for money, with an estimated semi-elasticity which indicates that 
when the interest rate is raised by 100 basis points, the real demand for money is reduced by 0.2–
0.3 of a percentage point. Such a relatively large interest semi-elasticity is expected of the 
Indonesian economy, given that the monetary authority has used punitive interest rates to control 
the real demand for money and consequently curb inflation. The most notable instance of this 
occurred during the period of financial crisis in 1998. To account for the structural break in 
money supply in 1998 and another one in 1989, two impulse dummy variables are included in the 
LM equation. 
 
In the inflation equation, we impose a long-run vertical Phillips curve restriction whereby 
the sum of future and past inflation terms adds up to one. Imposing this restriction gives us an 
OLS coefficient of 0.23 for the future inflation term, which is very close to the calibrated value in 
the Batini-Haldane model. Thus, the implied elasticity for lagged inflation is 0.77. It seems that 
economic agents in Indonesia tend to be more backward rather than forward-looking in forming 
their expectations of inflation. The high persistence of inflation means that the current rate of 
inflation is strongly influenced by the previous period’s inflation rate and not so much by 
expected future inflation. This might be partly due to the fact that during the financial crisis, for   15
example, BI did not get much credibility for its attempt to target the inflation rate. Thus, the 
general public has tended to form their views about the current, and perhaps also the future, 
inflation rate based on past realized inflation. This conjecture will be re-examined later in our 
simulation exercises. The effect of a change in the nominal exchange rate is another robustly 
estimated parameter in the inflation equation. A 10% depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
will cause the inflation rate to immediately rise by 1.1%. 
 
The main domestic source of inflation seems to be increases in the money stock. This is 
not surprising in the light of the results reported in Siregar and Rajaguru (2005). For a 10% 
increase in the money supply, the current inflation rate will increase by 1.2%. As for the total 
output gap variable, we decided to drop it after several attempts to include it at various lags failed 
to produce correctly signed and statistically significant estimates. Similarly, the impact of the 
foreign price change on domestic inflation is estimated to be small and insignificant so it was also 
omitted from the final specification of the Indonesian SSMM. 
 
Finally, the estimated Taylor rule suggests that the long-run real interest rate for the 
Indonesian economy is around 14%. We also found that the total output gap affects the behaviour 
of the Central Bank with a lag of three, and not one, quarters. The estimated coefficient on the 
gap is 0.42. The inflation gap lagged one period is found to have a coefficient of 1.08, which 
means that for every 1 percentage point increase in the inflation gap, BI will increase the policy 
rate by 1.08 percentage point. Finally, the pressure from exchange rate changes also contributes 
significantly to interest rate movements with a positive coefficient of 0.27 and it takes half a year 
for the BI to react to this change. Our results are broadly similar to those in Taylor (1993), who 
obtained coefficients for the output gap and inflation gap of 0.5 and 1.5 respectively.
10 This 
                                                 
10Note, however, the original Taylor rule is specified to with respect to the contemporaneous output and 
    inflation gap.   16
suggests that our modified Taylor rule might be a satisfactory approximation to the conduct of 
Indonesian monetary policy. We will, therefore, use these estimated and other calibrated 
coefficients in our analysis of the performance of alternative monetary policy rules. 
 
The R
2 test-statistics suggests a good fit for every structural equation in our model, which 
is above 0.73 for all equations except for the policy rule. F-statistics confirm that the explanatory 
variables are jointly significant. Engle’s ARCH results suggest no heteroskedasticity is found in 
the residuals of the equations, except for the inflation equation. Similarly, the Jarque-Bera test-
statistics reject the normality of residuals only in the inflation and policy rule equations.  
 
4. Simulation  Experiments 
Two sets of policy simulation experiments are carried out here: the first set is designed to 
evaluate the credibility of monetary policy while the second set is mainly aimed at evaluating 
alternative monetary policy rules. 
 
4.1 Model  Evaluation 
Before performing the policy simulations, we present the within-sample predictive performance 
of the Indonesian SSMM in the dynamic and deterministic setting by comparing the baseline 
simulation results of the model with actual historical outcomes. In this simulation, our aim is to 
examine how the model performs in tracking the historical reality in Indonesia. Specifically, the 
charts shown in Figure 1 illustrate how our model would have performed if we had used it back in 
1983 to make a forecast for the Indonesian economy over the next twenty years, assuming that we 
had used the correct paths for the exogenous variables.
11 
 
                                                 
11 In reality, of course, we would not have known these values at the time the forecasts were generated.   17
All the structural equations performed well during the period prior to the Asian financial 
crisis. However, the simulated non-oil output, money supply, and exchange rate show deviations 
from actual outcomes after 1997/1998—a period when Indonesia was experiencing economic 
turmoil—although they do seem to follow the general trends in the data. In the case of the 
exchange rate, the discrepancy between the simulated and actual values most likely reflects an 
increased risk premium on the Indonesian Rupiah which our model did not allow for. The oil 
output and the inflation equations show a good fit for the entire period under study. As for the 
monetary policy rule, the baseline result broadly captures the cycles in the domestic interest rate 
but it is not able to reproduce well the latter’s volatility. This may not matter much since we are 
going to experiment with different coefficients in the rule when performing stochastic policy 
simulations later.  
 
4.2  The Role of Credibility in Inflation Targeting 
The scenario in our first deterministic simulation concerns different degrees of credibility that 
people have in the central bank. This is reflected in the formation of inflationary expectations. 
Earlier in Section 3, we specified expected inflation as
*
1 1 ) 1 ( π λ λπ π − + = + + t t t E , whereby 
* π  
represents the inflation target and  1 0 ≤ ≤ λ  represents a measure of credibility of the inflation 
targeting monetary authority. As λ approaches 1, the policy becomes less credible since very little 
weight is given by economic agents to the inflation target in the formation of inflationary 
expectations. The opposite is true as λ approaches 0. Therefore, the parameter λ can be 
interpreted as the credibility parameter for the central bank. 
 
In our inflation targeting scenario, we will look at several cases where the credibility 
given to the central bank is zero (the credibility parameter is 1); between zero and full credibility 
(the credibility parameter is between 0 and 1); and finally full credibility (the credibility   18
parameter is 0). We will then compare the disinflation effects of different degrees of credibility in 
the face of a reduction in the inflation target by specifying an out-of-sample simulation whereby 
the inflation target is reduced by 1 percentage point. The results are shown in Figure 2. 
 
In Figure 2, we see that when the central bank has zero credibility—as shown by the solid 
line—it takes an extremely long time for the inflation target to be achieved. This is because if the 
public does not have any confidence in the Central Bank, they rely more on the past inflation rate 
to form their expectations of future inflation, thus introducing substantial inertia into the actual 
inflation rate. If we look at the coefficient of the lagged inflation term in our estimated SSMM, 
the elasticity of 0.77 supports our claim. Although somewhat extreme, our scenario of zero 
credibility might not be so unrealistic. In Indonesia, the inflation target is not publicly announced, 
so people have to form their expectations on the inflation rate in the next period based on the past 
inflation rate and other information. Moreover, the (implicit) inflation target in Indonesia tends to 
change frequently, causing people to lose trust in the Central Bank’s determination and ability to 
achieve the target.  
 
If the Central Bank can successfully build up at least 50% credibility, i.e. when people 
put equal weights on the model-consistent expected inflation rate and the inflation target 
announced by the Central Bank, the inflation target can be reached by around 15 quarters, as 
shown by the line with rectangles in Figure 2. This result is of even more interest to the BI—the 
central bank must show some commitment to the public that it is determined and able to achieve 
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When the Central Bank gains full credibility from the public, then the inflation target will be met 
in 3 years’ time as shown by the dashed line in Figure 2. The implication of our results is that BI 
does not require an extremely high level of confidence on the part of economic agents in order to 
achieve the inflation target, but as long as it can “signal” its commitment to meet the inflation 
target clearly to the public, inflation can be brought down much faster. 
 
4.3  The Policy Frontier 
In this exercise, we experiment with different weights for the inflation, output, and exchange rate 
variables in the modified Taylor rule equation to trace out the so-called policy frontier. The policy 
frontier is defined as a set of combinations of inflation and output gap volatility that can be 
attained given a particular form of the policy rule. It is traced out by varying the coefficients on   21
the inflation and output gap in Equation (7) and then plotting the standard deviations for these 
two target variables that are obtained from stochastic simulation of the Indonesian SSMM. 
 
In this exercise, we will deal with two cases. In the first case, we assume no exchange 
rate effect to be present in the Taylor rule and in the second case, the nominal exchange rate is 
explicitly included in the policy rule. Furthermore, we will restrict the sum of the parameters on 
the output and inflation gaps to be equal to one. We feel that by looking at recent trends, more 
meaningful policy implications can be drawn rather than by focusing on the whole sample 
because during and after the crisis period, the monetary authority seems to be looking for a 
“mechanical” rule to guide their policy-making management after the collapse of the managed-
floating exchange rate system. Consequently, we will focus on generating the policy frontier for 
the time period of 1996–2003. 
 
The results from the alternative Taylor rules are traced out in Figure 3. The policy 
frontier (and its constituent points) that moves in the southwest direction corresponds to a better 
outcome for the economy since it will generate less volatility in both the output gap and inflation. 
Along each frontier, the points depict the trade-off between output and inflation volatility as 
measured by the standard deviations in percentage terms. Our results show that without assuming 
any exchange rate feedback in the policy rule, a Taylor-type rule with both inflation and output 
targeting generates a superior result for the economy in terms of lower variability in output and 
inflation as shown by the short-dashed line. This means that by heeding concerns on both 
inflation and output stability, the authority can direct the economy into an improved state of 
welfare. In the figure, the solid line corresponds to a zero weight for the output gap in the policy 
rule and varying the weight attached to the inflation gap—a strict ‘inflation targeting’ regime. As 
the weight on the latter is gradually increased, we move in the northwest direction. The long-  22
dashed line is obtained by changing the weight attached to the output gap while assigning a zero 
weight to the inflation gap—an ‘output targeting’ regime. 
 
As the weight on the inflation is gradually increased, we move in the northwest direction 
(the solid line). The results are in line with research in this area which found that, when the 
authority targets only the inflation rate, the variability of inflation will be lowered at the cost of 
increased volatility of the output gap (Saxegaard 2000; de Freitas and Muinhos 1999). The same 
logic applies when the authority only cares about output stability. However, the short-dashed line 
in Figure 3 lies below the solid and the long-dashed line in the southwest direction, suggesting an 
improvement when the authority cares about both output and inflation stability. In particular, we 
find that equal weights given to the output and inflation gaps in this policy rule will generate the 
lowest possible combination of output gap and inflation volatility of 4.39% and 5.3% 
respectively. 




































   23
When we introduce the modified Taylor rule with the exchange rate present, the 
simulation results show that there is a further improvement in terms of reducing both output gap 
and inflation volatility. The short-long-dashed line, representing the results from this modified 
rule, lies below the short-dashed line, suggesting that a further improvement in terms of 
macroeconomic stabilization policy is possible.
12 Specifically, the results show that for a weight 
of 0.2 given to the exchange rate term in the policy equation, the best combination of output gap 
and inflation volatility of 4.36% and 5.2% can be achieved. 
 
To understand our results better, we will explain the economics behind them. The solid 
line frontier in Figure 3 that corresponds to strict inflation targeting tells us that BI will only 
respond to the change in the inflation gap and as the weight attached to it is increased, the 
magnitude of the policy response will also increase. In other words, as the weight attached to the 
inflation gap is increased, the policy rate—the interest rate—will be raised by a bigger amount. A 
higher interest rate will then cause money demand to fall, as is evident from the LM equation 
whereby the interest rate has a negative elasticity with respect to money demand. As money 
demand and supply falls, the inflation rate also declines. Furthermore, there is an indirect effect 
working through the UIP equation that reinforces the drop in the inflation rate because an 
increase in the policy rate will appreciate the Rupiah, thus reducing foreign inflationary 
pressures.
13 The result is that inflation volatility will be brought down at the cost of an increase in 
output gap volatility, which increases due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
12 We vary the weight attached to the exchange rate term starting from 0.1 up to 0.5 only since increasing 
the weight to more than 0.5 generates unstable results. The weights attached to the inflation and output gap 
is whatever 1 minus the weight attached to the exchange rate term and then divided equally among them.  
13 Note also that when we trace out the policy frontier in the context of strict inflation targeting, we set the 
coefficient on exchange rate to be equal to zero. Thus, we eliminate any direct pressure from the exchange 
rate unto the interest rate as specified by the modified Taylor rule, i.e. it becomes a standard Taylor-type 
rule.   24
The long-dashed line in Figure 3 traces out the policy frontier whereby the authority is 
only concerned about minimizing output volatility regardless of inflation volatility. In this case, 
BI will only respond to any deviation that occurs in the output gap term in the monetary policy 
rule equation. When output falls below trend, the domestic interest rate is lowered in response, 
leading to an immediate depreciation of the exchange rate which in turn improves the 
competitiveness of the economy, resulting in a rise in exports and thus output. The depreciation 
now leads to an increase in the domestic price level. At the same time, money demand increases 
with the output level, which aggravates inflation. Consequently, output variability is reduced 
under an output targeting regime, but at the expense of higher inflation variability. 
 
What is interesting and important is that when BI targets both inflation and output, then 
their variability can be reduced. This is because the effect from the depreciation in the real 
exchange rate (that increases output volatility) is countered by a lower interest rate. This means 
that by caring not only for output but also inflation, the total variability of the economy can be 
mitigated. Furthermore, by acknowledging the role of the exchange rate, the ability of the central 
Bank to reduce the volatility of the output gap and inflation is improved further, as is evident 
from the fact that the short-long-dashed line rests entirely below the short-dashed line in the 
southwest direction in Figure 3. The implication is that, apart from responding to output and 
inflation gaps, BI is stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations in a way that is beneficial to the 
economy. The improvement resulting from the inclusion of the exchange rate argument is in 
contrast to the conclusion stated in Ball (1999), Svensson (2000) and Taylor (2000b) which found 
no, or little, improvement with an exchange rate variable. We will discuss the policy implications 
of our empirical findings in the concluding section. 
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5.  Policy Implications and Conclusion 
The first policy implication that we can draw from this study is that the small scale 
macroeconomic model that we have built is able to capture the short to medium-term economic 
dynamics in Indonesia. This finding suggests that the implementation of a small scale model 
warrants consideration in policy-making and it can also provide a cross-check on results from 
larger scale models developed and maintained by BI, such as the Annual Model of Bank 
Indonesia MODBI.
14 An important feature is that our model explicitly considers the role of 
expectations in the form of model-consistent expectations. This is important because the lack of 
any forward-looking element significantly decreases the ability of the model to provide a credible 
description of the economy which is valuable to policymakers.  
 
A second implication concerns the conduct of monetary policy in Indonesia. Based on a 
deterministic simulation exercise, we show that the credibility of the Central Bank is very 
important for achieving sustainable non-inflationary economic growth. In the case where the 
Central Bank has no credibility at all as perceived by the public, it will take an extremely long 
time for the inflation rate to be brought down to the targeted level. Nevertheless, we see a major 
improvement when the Central Bank can successfully build some credibility. This finding 
supports the new Central Bank Act in 1999 that requires BI to announce the inflation target on a 
regular basis to the public so as to ensure its accountability. By announcing the inflation target, BI 
can “earn” the credibility it requires and the public’s beliefs can be built up gradually. When BI 
can successfully achieve this “critical” level of credibility by announcing and committing to the 
inflation target, we can expect a reduction in inflation volatility that will ensure the sustainability 
of economic growth in Indonesia.  
 
                                                 
14 See Warjiyo (2001) for existing macroeconomic models of Indonesia.   26
The final and most important implication is that the best Taylor-type policy rule for BI is 
to focus on a monetary policy rule with equal weights given to the output gap and inflation gap. 
The literature on monetary policy rules has often been restricted to a closed economy framework. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus in recent years that an explicit modeling of the 
exchange rate is a necessary condition for a macroeconomic model to provide a credible 
description of the monetary transmission mechanism in a small open economy. This is also 
evident from the rapid increase in the number of structural models with an explicit role for the 
exchange rate such as Blake and Westaway (1996), Ball (1999), Svensson (2000), Batini and 
Nelson (2000), Leitemo and Roisland (2000), and Leitemo and Soderstrom (2000).  
 
Our study shows that the exchange rate plays a crucial role in the conduct of monetary 
policy and in ensuring the stability of the Indonesian economy that is in line with key findings 
from Siregar and Ward (2002). Specifically, this paper proposes a rule in which the exchange rate 
is also an important target variable so as to capture the open economy aspects of the Indonesian 
economy. When we introduce an exchange rate argument in the monetary policy rule, BI can 
reduce the variability of output gap and the inflation rate further as compared to the best Taylor-
type rule that we have specified in this paper, provided that certain threshold is met when 
assigning the weights on exchange rate variable. We believe that this finding is a crucial 
indication of how important the exchange rate could be in the future course of monetary policy 
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APPENDIX 
 
The datasets used in the Indonesian SSMM comes from several sources and it covers quarterly 
series from 1983 to 2003. The Indonesian Consumer Price Index (CPI) data, the world CPI data, 
the domestic short-term interest rate, the foreign interest rate, the oil price, exchange rates, and 
annual Indonesian government expenditure are taken from the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) CD-ROM (latest edition for April 2004 by the International Monetary Fund). The quarterly 
data on real GDP, money supply as given by M1, and the core inflation data from 1988 to 2003 is 
by courtesy of Dr. Martin Panggabean, Chief Economist at Bank Mandiri, Indonesia. The 
quarterly data on real oil output from 1993 to 2003 is obtained from the website of Bank 
Indonesia (www.bi.go.id). 
 
We have to resort to the Chow-Lin interpolation method to construct the quarterly oil 
output data from 1983 to 1993. We use the average oil price series (in US Dollars) that is 
obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD ROM is employed as related series 
to perform disaggregation in the oil output data. In doing so, we found some interesting points to 
note. The full sample data from 1983 to 2003 yielded a cross-correlation between oil output and 
oil price of 0.40, confirming that the oil price is a good related series for interpolating oil output. 
However, the positive and strong relationship between the oil price and oil output seems to be 
distorted by the occurrence of the Asian financial crisis. During the crisis, the Indonesian 
authority abandoned the historical managed floating exchange rate system, thus subjecting the 
Rupiah/US dollar to high volatility. Since we use the Rupiah oil price as the related series, the 
change in the exchange rate regime will affect the relationship between the oil price and output. 
As a remedy, we excluded the permanent structural break starting from 1998, the year when the   28
impact of financial crisis was most severe for Indonesia. By doing so, the cross-correlation 
between oil output and the oil price improved to 0.68
15.  
 
In constructing the foreign income level and the nominal effective exchange rate indices 
we use are the export shares to Indonesia’s major trading partners as weights. The export data that 
we utilized is the data on merchandise exports between countries to measure bilateral trade flows. 
This is obtained from the Econometric Studies Unit (ESU) of the Department of Economics, 
National University of Singapore. The export-share matrix (W)  is calculated as a 12-quarter 
moving average of export shares. This method has some benefits according to Abeysinghe and 
Forbes (2001). It allows the export share matrix to vary smoothly over time, for example. Our 
final dataset consists of 11 real foreign GDP series and 121 export share series, all compiled on a 
quarterly basis from 1983:Q1 through 2003:Q4. Formally, the construction of the foreign income 

































                                                 
15 The regression result also shows an improvement in the R
2 from 0.16 to 0.58 after eliminating the 
permanent structural break, showing a much better fit of the model.   29
Table 2: Variable description for datasets used in Indonesian SSMM 
 
Variable  Description (1993 = 100 for real variables) 
y  Real GDP 
y
 o  Real oil output 
y 
no  Real non-oil output 
oil  Average oil prices (in Rupiah) 
m  Money Supply 
p  Domestic Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 p 
f  World Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
i  Nominal short-term interest rates 
i 
f  US 3-Month T-Bill rates 
y 
f  Foreign income index using export shares as weights 
e  Exchange rate index using export shares as weights 
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